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Hong Kong’s civil society is alive and well. As socialawareness rises and citizen wealth grows, a greaternumber of residents give time to civil society activi-
ties and more private resources are put into community-build-
ing endeavours–the philanthropy sector is therefore growing.
Yet, there is much frustration among civil society actors. The
problem lies with the city’s politics. The unique nature of the
political system where elections do not return a government
produces a very special kind of disarticulation and disconnec-
tion between power-holders and other political actors and
non-governmental groups (NGOs). Moreover, the Chinese
Community Party’s “united front” activities to support pre-
ferred candidates at elections, as well as certain official posi-
tions, have the effect of distorting “public opinion” especially
in matters relating to constitutional development, where Bei-
jing plays a highly interventionist role. Yet, there seems to be
something irrepressible about the people of Hong Kong as a
whole, who have been willing to come out in very great num-
bers when they feel their way of life is threatened. The politi-
cisation of Hong Kong people and their NGOs continue as
the realisation grows that good governance requires active cit-
izenship and institutions within a political system that allows
for societal conflicts to be settled by means that have genuine
public support. There is a tussle with Beijing over process,
which ultimately determines whether the HKSAR’s power-
holders have the legitimacy to govern.
This article will first provide an overview of Hong Kong’s
NGOs before looking at how they function to fulfil their
missions, and how they fit into the city’s politics and Bei-
jing’s role, before coming to concluding observations.Hong Kong’s  Third  Sec tor
It is accepted in academic circles for NGOs to be cate-
gorised as part of a distinct organisational sector that has a
unique identity and characteristic features. This sector is
often referred to as the “Third Sector” to set it apart from
the government and commercial sectors. Its vitality comes
from shared values among the actors rather than a drive for
direct political power or commercial gains, as is the case for
the other two sectors respectively. In many societies people
come together to further collective values, perhaps through
dedicating time and money to benevolent causes, civic and
humanitarian need, religious and spiritual beliefs, or through
new ideas for secular progress. Hong Kong is no different.
The most authoritative study of Hong Kong’s civil society
was commissioned by the HKSAR Government’s Central
Policy Unit in 2002 and published in 2004. The Study of
the Third Sector Landscape in Hong Kong (Study) looked
at the history and organisation of non-profit, voluntary and
self-governing NGOs in their aims, structures and opera-
tions. The Study covered NGOs in many fields, including
arts and culture, economy, environment, education, health,
human rights, law, philanthropy, politics, sports and recre-
ation, religion and welfare, and identified over 16,660
NGOs in Hong Kong as of 2002((1). 
In its review of history of the Third Sector, the Study noted
that over 85% of NGOs were formed after 1946?many be-
tween 1986 and 1997((2). Indeed, there was a new phase of
NGO evolution in the 1980s, as Hong Kong prepared for
the transfer of sovereignty from British to Chinese rule, and
as elections had to be introduced to fulfil the promise in the
Sino-British Joint Declaration that the legislature would be
elected. District Boards with a measure of election were in-
troduced in 1982 as a laboratory for democratisation, and a
number of legislators were elected by functional constituency
(special interest groups, including corporate voting) in 1985
and 1988. The 1989 Tiananmen crackdown marked a turn-
ing point in popular attitude towards political participation
and a belief that democracy would be the best guarantee for
the city’s liberal way of life. New NGOs to push for democ-
racy were formed in response to the tumultuous events of the
1980s. In 1991, when Hong Kong held its first ever direct
elections to the Legislative Council, pro-democracy groups
and new political parties won all the 18 seats up for grabs al-
though the majority of the seats were still appointed by the
colonial administration. 
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1. Central Policy Unit, The Study of the Third Sector Landscape in Hong Kong, August 24th
2004, http://www.cpu.gov.hk/english/research_reports.htm. Chapter 15 noted a total of
16,662 organisations formed the population of the study, p. 419. 
2. Ibid., Chapter 15, Survey, p. 423. 
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Hong Kong’s Civil Society
With the encouragement of the mainland authorities, “pro-
China” forces also began more overt activities to organise
and participate in elections to District Boards, the Munici-
pal Councils and Legislative Council, culminating in the
birth of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of
Hong Kong (DAB) and the reinforcement of the Federa-
tion of Trade Unions (FTU) to run for election. At the
same time, Hong Kong’s business establishment became
concerned that both the “pro-democracy” and “pro-China”
forces articulated “grassroots” interests, and in response
formed the “pro-business” Liberal Party. Being pro-estab-
lishment in nature, the Liberal Party sided with the “pro-
China” forces on constitutional reform issues, and ran for
election in the functional constituencies to promote the inter-
ests of specific business sectors. 
At the same time that it had to face imminent political
change, Hong Kong also emerged as a more cosmopolitan
society in the 1990s. More people concerned themselves
with social issues, including welfare provision, quality educa-
tion, pollution and a clean environment, animal rights and
welfare, equal opportunities, minority rights and freedom of
the press. NGOs also began to work on the mainland, with
some serving needs across the border exclusively((3). More-
over, international NGOs also have a significant presence in
Hong Kong for fundraising and regional outreach. Today,
many Hong Kong NGOs also hook into global discourse on
poverty alleviation, climate change, and HIV/AIDS. An
important trend since the late 1990s was the disappointment
with corporate behaviour–the Enron malaise–and workplace
burnout, which resulted in younger professionals leaving cor-
porate life to seek gratification in NGOs. Worldwide inter-
est in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has also resulted
in new NGOs doing local and regional promotion for corpo-
rate governance, minority shareholder rights, workplace di-
versity and ethical-sustainable investment in Asia. 
The Study acknowledged Hong Kong’s civil sector to be
“highly dynamic, innovative and resourceful((4)”. Examining
the date of establishment of the NGOs provides a good in-
dication of the evolution of civil society in Hong Kong:
Before 1841, NGOs were religious or welfare provision or-
ganisations. Between 1841-1911, numerous community bod-
ies were formed, including some business associations and
trade unions. Between 1912 and 1975, 50% of religious bod-
ies now found in Hong Kong were formed, and between
1946 and 1985, half the industry and business associations,
educational and welfare bodies were formed.
Between 1986 and 1997, 62.5% of health organisations, al-
most 50% of the environmental groups, international
NGOs, civic and advocacy groups now in Hong Kong were
formed. Between 1987 and 1997, 83% of the political organ-
isations now in Hong Kong were formed. The earlier hesi-
tation among many NGOs to remain “non-political” began
to ease as social actors determined which issue they pur-
sued–welfare, health or green–, and the city’s politics and
political institutions began to matter as civil society activists
generally wanted change and reform of policies, priorities
and systems.
While the sector took on its importance between 1976 and
1985, in the period 1998 to 2002, 50% of philanthropic in-
termediaries now found in Hong Kong were formed((5).Overview – Snapshot  o f  Hong Kong’s  NGOs
The population size of different types of NGOs varies
tremendously. At one end of the scale are the more than ten
thousand district-based groups providing services in small lo-
calities, while at the other end are a handful of NGOs work-
ing in political areas. Over 70% of Hong Kong NGOs pri-
marily serve their members, while the rest serve the public
at large. The Study found that around 52% of NGOs serve
neighbourhoods or districts within Hong Kong, while 44%
serve the whole of Hong Kong. 
As there is no legal form dedicated to NGOs in Hong Kong
equivalent to the économie sociale in France, most NGOs
in Hong Kong are formed as societies, companies or trusts.
There is no government restriction on governance for most
of the Third Sector in Hong Kong in terms of size or com-
position of its governing board. However, for those NGOs
receiving substantial public funds for the provision of serv-
ices, such as in welfare and health, provision is made for the
appointment of certain government representatives to over-
see their management. The largest source of operating in-
come for NGOs came from government funding (28%), and
not surprisingly since so many NGOs provide basic services
to the community. Other major sources of income were
membership fees (18%) and private donations and sponsor-
ship (15%). The Study made a conservative estimate that at
least 3.7 million people out of a population of about 6.8 mil-
lion were members of NGOs, but numbers could in fact be
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3. Ibid., Chapter 15, Survey, p. 427. The survey showed about 4.5% of NGOs in Hong Kong
serve a province or an area within a province, 2.6% serve two or more provinces or
areas within provinces, and 8.2% serve the whole of China.
4. Ibid., Content and Overview, p. 15.
5. Ibid., Chapter 15, pp. 424-425.
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very much greater((6). However, only 47% of NGOs have
tax exempt status((7).
The Study found a total of between 150,000 and
372,000 people work in NGOs in Hong Kong, generat-
ing expenditures of HK$18.59 billion and HK$27.36
billion as of October 2002. That translated to 4.6% and
11.4% of total employment and 1.5% to 2.2% of GDP
in 2002. Thus, in terms of size, the NGO sector is com-
parable to the manufacturing sector, construction indus-
try or transport, storage and communications sector. 
Contributions made by volunteer labour in the Third
Sector ranged from HK$52.9 to HK$83.3 million in
2002. Moreover, the Study estimated 550,000 to
710,000 Hong Kong residents participate in some sort
of volunteer activity, which contributed greatly to Hong
Kong’s overall quality of life and opportunities for per-
sonal development. Even at the lower end of the esti-
mate, the number of volunteers equated to about 15.7%
of the total workforce((8). The importance of the Third
Sector in Hong Kong can also be seen from the services
it provides to people. The Study estimated that each
person living in the city received on average, 4.3 times
a year, some service from NGOs in areas where the
government and commercial sectors made no provi-
sion((9).
The Publi c  Opinion Tussle
What do Hong Kong people think? The longstanding
stereotype has been a lack of interest in politics and an in-
terest only in money. While the 1989 rallies in response to
the Tiananmen crackdown showed that the people of Hong
Kong had the capacity to react politically, it was not until
2003 that they came out in great numbers once more.
The most dramatic event of the past ten years was on July
1st 2003 when more than 500,000 people took to the
streets to protest against what was referred to as Article 23
of the national security legislation((10). The people who took
to the streets on the sixth anniversary of the handover were
mainly from middle class families (60%) and many were pro-
fessionals or semi-professionals. According to survey find-
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6. Ibid., Chapter 15, p. 439. The estimated range was from 3.7 million to 8.3 million. 
7. Ibid., Chapter 15, pp. 425-426. NGOs have to apply separately to the Inland Revenue De-
partment for tax exempt status after incorporation. 
8. Ibid., Chapter 15, pp. 443-444.
9. Ibid., Chapter 15, p.442.
10. Article 23 of the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s post-1997 constitution) requires that Hong
Kong “shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition,
subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit
foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region
and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with
foreign political organizations or bodies”.
Table 1. Areas served by Hong Kong’s NGOs (2002)
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ings, less than one in twenty of the marchers went to the
rally with NGOs that they belonged to, while only 34% re-
garded the mobilising power of social organisations as influ-
ential. Researchers concluded that the July 1st demonstra-
tion was mobilised by the people and not by associations((11).
These bands of citizens were considered to be not those
who would normally participate in street protests. Their par-
ticipation also served to wake the authorities and NGOs up
to the fact that the citizens they served had the capacity to
be highly motivated and politicised. 
The people felt strong enough to mobilise themselves to
protest because they felt that their way of life was under
threat by Article 23. This was despite the government’s
claim that it had consulted the public and the legislation had
public support. The government packaged responses for its
convenience rather than to analyse the respondents’ views,
attitudes and suggestions. The responses showed the united
front machinery was hard at work. Scholars who subse-
quently ploughed through the responses noted:
… we also found that amongst the about 1,000 submis-
sions from organizations, a number of letters came
from organizations which differ greatly in nature and
geographical location, yet shared very similar content
or format, having no big difference from standard let-
ters. Why did the government not doubt the independ-
ence of these submissions from organizations then((12)?
The draft bill was set to be passed in the Legislative Council
on July 9th since the HKSAR Government had sufficient
votes from the DAB, Liberal Party and their allies to get it
through. Various pro-democracy, human rights and law NGOs
came together to organise a march, the turnout for which sur-
prised everyone. The rally caused the Liberal Party to break
ranks from the government thus leading to Tung Chee Hwa
having to withdraw the bill as the government no longer had
enough votes in the legislature to ensure its passage.
The rally was a resounding public rejection of Tung Chee
Hwa. It signalled a lack of confidence in his governance, a
lack of trust in his administration, and a deep dissatisfaction
with his performance. He had made a string of unpopular
and controversial decisions since taking office((13). Indeed,
many of the protesters saw the Tung administration as a
threat to Hong Kong’s established way of life. Indeed, there
had been an average of six protests a day every year since
1997 against government policies or policy demands((14).
The legacy of the July 1st 2003 protest was to inject re-
newed energy into the democracy movement. It made
NGOs realise they had underestimated public support for
reform. The protesters explicitly demanded rapid democrati-
sation?a sign that the public’s trust in the existing political
order was weak. People had made an explicit link between
the lack of democracy and poor governance. Polls at the
time showed an overwhelming majority of respondents sup-
ported the direct election of the Chief Executive and the
Legislative Council (81% and 77% respectively) in princi-
ple, and large majorities (70% and 69% respectively)
wanted direct elections by 2007 and 2008((15). There was
also a burst of activism aimed at asserting beliefs that peo-
ple felt the government did not share with them. The after-
math of the protest saw the coming together of opinion-lead-
ers and -shapers to call for the upholding of Hong Kong’s
liberal “core values((16)”.
At the same time, Tung Chee Hwa had to assuage public
anger. He said he would pay more attention to public opin-
ion, specifically of the “middle class”. He said he would in-
crease funding for district and community activities and his
administration would engage the public more in developing
its policies((17).
The political fallout from Article 23 continued with the Dis-
trict Council elections in November 2003, where DAB can-
didates did badly compared with the pro-democracy candi-
dates, even though united front efforts worked hard to help
preferred candidates((18). Beijing became alarmed at the
growing demands for democracy. In April 2004, the Standing
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11. Robert Chung and Joseph Man Chan, A Revelation of 1 July: Internet Mobilization Gives
New Life to Democracy, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/columns/columns24.html. 
12. Jennifer So-Kuen Chan, Let Figures Speak For Themselves – Reanalysis on the Public
Opinion Towards Article 23 Consultation Document, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/
columns/columns19.html
13. The problems of Tung Chee Hwa and his administration have been well-documented by
many scholars. See Lau Siu-kai (edited), The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The
First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Chinese University
Press, Hong Kong (2002); and Joseph YS Cheng (edited), The July 1 Protest Rally: Inter-
preting a Historic Event, City University of Hong Kong Press, Hong Kong, (2005).
14. Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society,
Hong Kong University Press, 2007, 0.181.
15. Michael DeGolyer, Listening to the Wisdom of the Masses, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Tran-
sition Project, HK Baptist University, January 2004.
16. See www.hkcorevalues.net.
17. Doing Justice to Public Opinion and Public Consultations: What to Do and What Not to
Do: A Case Study of the Government Consultation Exercise on its Proposals to Implement
Article 23 of the Basic Law, Public Opinion Programme, University of Hong Kong,
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english.resources/bl23/bl23gp/report/index.html .
18. The united front machinery, co-ordinated in Hong Kong by Beijing’s Liaison Office in the
HKSAR, has a long history of assisting pro-China and post-1997 pro-government forces in
winning elections. This included Tung Chee Hwa’s selection in 1996 and 2002, the Legisla-
tive Council elections in 1998, 2000 and 2004, and Donald Tsang’s selection in 2005 and
2007. For an analysis of how the machinery works, see Lo Shiu-hing, ““Legitimising” the Se-
lection of the Second HKSAR Chief Executive: From the Election Committee to the Chief Ex-
ecutive Election Bill”, China Perspectives, Number 38, November-December 2001, pp.44-59.
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Committee of the National People’s Congress handed down a
“decision” that Hong Kong would not be able to elect its chief
executive in 2007 and legislature in 2008 by universal suffrage.
Hong Kong people were considered to not be ready and reform
had to be more gradual. Hong Kong people had not expected
such aggressive action from Beijing((19). 
Once the door was shut for 2007 and 2008, “consultations”
were rolled out. In January 2005, Tung Chee Hwa announced
the formation of the Constitutional Development Task Force
to hold the line and remind people of Beijing’s ultimate power
in determining the pace and direction of reform in Hong
Kong. With Tung’s resignation in March 2005 and Donald
Tsang succeeding him, the first two years of the Tsang admin-
istration was spent giving people a chance to make reform sug-
gestions within the set restrictions. However, the government
analysis of consultation responses had a not dissimilar ap-
proach to that for Article 23. The way responses were cate-
gorised was not designed to seek meaningful understanding but
merely to conclude that there was no consensus on how to pro-
ceed and to exclude responses that fell outside the parameters
set by the Standing Committee((20). In October 2005, Tsang put
forward a set of reform proposals that allowed a small measure
of reform without altering the political structure that did not win
the required two-thirds majority support in the Legislative Coun-
19. The Interpretation by the SCNPC of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex III to the
Basic Law, adopted at the tenth NPC at its 8th Session, April 6th 2004,
www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/basic/pdf/es22004080554.pdf.
20. Constitutional Development Task Force’s Fourth Report noted that the government had re-
ceived a total of 488 valid written submissions from individuals and organisations, relating
to the methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 and for forming the Legislative
Council in 2008. Among them, 118 submissions were put forward by organisations. Its Fifth
Report noted that 460 written submissions were received with 191 from organisations. 
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In 2007, democrats have put forward 
various blueprints for universal suffrage
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21. Constitutional Development Task Force’s Fifth Report,
http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/report5/pdf/5th_Report/English.pdf
22. There has been significant collaboration and alliances that have been continuing for the
past few years linking harbour reclamation, urban planning, city design, heritage preser-
vation and environment among NGOs. They have used the Town Planning process.
23. The Society for Protection of the Harbour has fought seven legal challenges against the
government and the Town Planning Board over reclamation decisions, and won six of
them, including obtaining a Court of Final Appeal decision on reclamation, and obtaining
indemnity costs for fighting a public interest case, which set a precedent in Hong Kong.
24. Central Policy Unit, “Overview of the Third Sector in Hong Kong”, The Study of the Third
Sector Landscape in Hong Kong, p.22.
25. A recent example is the formation of the Professional Commons, a group of profession-
als who fought for seats in 2006 on the 800-member Election Committee to select the
Chief Executive in 2007, in order that they can monitor the Chief Executive and govern-
ment policies more effectively.
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cil((21). Concluding observations
As Hong Kong comes to the end of its first decade as a Spe-
cial Administrative Region, the people’s public and political
consciousness have continued to evolve. There are new
NGOs being formed and NGO alliances constantly being
built((22). Besides democracy, two other major themes have
emerged–better planning and environmental protection; and
preserving Hong Kong identity, values and heritage. NGOs
are now less shy about using the courts to challenge govern-
ment decisions((23), and engaging politicians and the political
process, such as briefing legislators at Legislative Council
meetings and serving on government advisory bodies. There
is however still a high level of frustration that they have lim-
ited influence in the government’s policy formulation((24).
The frustration is leading NGO activists to work closer with
politicians’ offices and political parties, and in some case
even stand for election((25). 
There is a realisation that many of the NGOs’ tussles with
the HKSAR Government go to the heart of fundamental
differences in values, priorities and solutions. The politi-
cal system does not provide mechanisms for change to en-
able those who hold alternative visions to those of the es-
tablished political and economic elites have a chance to
hold political office. The political system is not about to
change any time soon in view of Beijing’s reservations.
While there are “consultations” about reform possibilities,
they are both limited in scope and infused with “united
front” narratives that are designed to hold the line rather
than to find a new system that will enable alternative vi-
sions to compete for political support. Like his predeces-
sor, chief executive Donald Tsang, is also saying his poli-
cies will reflect public opinion. But that is quite different
from encouraging competing ideas. Thus, on the one
hand, NGOs are becoming better able and even better
funded to challenge official decisions, while on the other,
those with competing ideas are likely to be branded as
“anti-government” elements, which will deepen their frus-
tration, leading to further politicisation of Hong Kong’s
Hong Kong’s Civil Society
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